I wrote this article on my blog last week. Some of you might find it interesting. The article’s main purpose is to argue for the coherence of the Johannine claim that Jesus is ‘the Word’. As such, the article is philosophical in scope rather than historical.
You can read the original article on my blog.
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”
The opening words of John’s Gospel are perplexing. The ‘Word’, we are told, is somehow ‘with God’ and ‘is God’. The evangelist goes on to say that the Word “became flesh and made his dwelling among us”, a verse crucial to the Christian doctrine of the incarnation.
Jesus Christ is the ‘Word’, who both ‘is God’ and ‘is with God’. It would be tempting to interpret these claims metaphorically: perhaps Jesus is God’s ‘Word’ in the sense of being the perfect expression of God’s will, or of God’s character. Certainly, other New Testament passages have that vibe (Col. 1:15). But the Johannine prologue seems to be saying something stronger than that. The Word, we are told, was “with God in the beginning”, and ” through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made”. Hence, Jesus the Word preexists his incarnation, and even the creation of the world. Indeed, he is the means by which the world was created.
As is well known, the evangelist is most likely drawing on the Hellenistic philosophical concept of logos, which English translations render as ‘Word’. The logos, for Stoic and Platonist philosophers, was usually a kind of supreme divine spirit which sustains the order and existence of the natural world. Jewish thinkers commonly identified this logos with what the Hebrew Bible calls wisdom ( ‘hokma’ , Prov. 8) or word (‘dabar’), as in the following verse from the Psalms:
“By the word of the LORD the heavens were made, and by the breath of his mouth all their host.” (Ps. 33:6)
The word is the means by which God brings the world into existence, and we have seen that this is what John the evangelist has in mind. Crucially, the Word is an attribute of God — the fact that the texts also call it ‘wisdom’ brings that out clearly. And yet, for the evangelist, the Word is also a divine person, who took flesh and walked among us.
The question I wish to address here is, how is it possible for a person, Jesus, to be identical to a divine attribute, the Word? This is intuitively very odd. We don’t normally think of attributes as things in their own right, but rather as features or aspects of things, like the color or solidity of my coffee mug. But Jesus the person clearly is a thing in its own right. To use the old philosophical jargon, we distinguish substances, which are things in their own right, and the attributes that such substances may have.
I think the answer to our question lies in a distinction between two different ways of thinking about the relationship between objects / substances and their attributes. I’m referring to what philosophers have called relational and constituent ontology (e.g. Wolterstoff 1991). Let us look at each of these in turn.
On a relational ontology, an object and its attributes are linked by a relation that may be called ‘exemplification’, ‘participation’ or ‘instantiation’ (these terms are largely interchangeable). Importantly, the attributes are conceived as being external to the object that exemplifies them. The attributes do not exist ‘in’ the objects that have them, rather, they exist in some abstract realm, a Platonic ‘realm of forms’. The exemplification relation acts as a kind of bridge between the abstract attribute and the concrete object that has it.
It should be clear that, given a relational ontology, the identification of Jesus with the Word is logically impossible, or at best utterly unintelligible. The person, Jesus, is a concrete thing that could be touched and directly perceived by those around him. But the Word, on a (purely) relational ontology, is an abstract thing. Surely it is impossible in principle for a concrete object to be identical to an abstract thing.
The problem remains even if we take the traditional interpretation of the Platonic realm of forms as God’s intellect. For if attributes are in fact ideas or concepts in the divine mind, then it would follow that the Word is an idea or concept in the divine mind. But the flesh-and-blood person, Jesus, is necessarily not an idea or concept. Hence, here again, it seems in principle impossible for Jesus to be the Word.
On a constituent ontology, in contrast, the attributes of an object are constituents of the object. Attributes are said to inhere in the objects that have them. They are part of what ‘makes up’ the object — or indeed, all that makes up the object, if one subscribes to ‘bundle-of-properties’-type views. In some constituent ontologies, attributes are simply identified with the object’s parts.
Wolterstorff notes that medieval (Christian) philosophers were themselves constituent ontologists, which is what allowed them to say, among other things, that God is his nature, i.e. his attributes taken together, rather than simply ‘having’ his nature.
The identification of Jesus with the Word seems much less problematic given a constituent ontology. Presumably, if attributes are constituents of concrete objects, then they are (or can be) themselves concrete. Hence, identifying Jesus with the Word does not compel us to say that Jesus both is and isn’t a concrete thing.
Granted, the notion that one of an object’s constituents could be a person, a conscious self, is still mysterious, even if the constituent isn’t some otherworldly abstractum. But consider panpsychism, a metaphysical theory associated with Leibniz, and still held by some philosophers today. Panpsychists hold that fundamental entities, e.g. subatomic particles, are conscious. Arguably, this implies that such particles are conscious selves, albeit very tiny ones. If that’s right, then, on panpsychism, my most basic constituents (insofar as I am ultimately constituted of subatomic particles) are conscious selves. This is would no doubt be very bizarre. But I see no reason to believe that it is in principle impossible, in the way that married bachelors, or indeed abstract persons, are impossible.
I conclude that, on a constituent ontology, the identification of Jesus with the Word, while mysterious, is not in principle impossible.
Some concluding observations
If we take the constituent ontologist’s interpretation of Jesus’ identity with the Word, then, insofar as the Word is an attribute of God, and that attributes are constituents of the things that have them, it follows that Jesus the Word is a constituent of God — more elegantly, an element of God’s being. Or, to paraphrase New Testament scholar Richard Bauckham, Jesus is ‘included within the divine identity’.
This allows us to deal with some of the theological paradoxes in the New Testament. Jesus, qua Word, is said by John the evangelist to be ‘God’, as we have seen. But the texts also speak of Jesus having a God, addressing God, being vindicated by God, and so on. Clearly, the relation between Jesus and God cannot be one of numerical identity, such as in ‘Batman is Bruce Wayne’.
What to make then, of John’s claim that Jesus ‘is’ God? Jesus the Word is not strictly (i.e. numerically) identical to God, but is nevertheless inseparable from God, since he is an element of God’s being. He is, in that sense, well and truly divine.
This, I think, sheds some light on the words of the Nicene Creed:
We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, of one Being with the Father. Through him all things were made.
Bauckham, R. (2002). God crucified. Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas (1991). Divine simplicity. Philosophical Perspectives 5:531-552.
Categories: Gospels, Jesus, Philosophy
Not sure if I understood the article right or not.
// it follows that Jesus the Word is a constituent of God — more elegantly, an element of God’s being//
But how can an element of God be fully God (i.e. God Himself)? Also, do christians approve that God should be understood as parts united together?
Morover, can we say the same thing said about the Word for the other attributes such the Wisdom, Knowledge, and Hearing of God. In fact, can we think about Jesus’ attributes on a constituent ontology?
Regarding the incarnation of this attribute (i.e. The Word);
Ibn Taymiyyah posed counter arguments against this doctrine by asking which of the two is actually united with the humanity of Christ: the Word with the essence (God) or the Word without the essence. If the first possibility were to be accepted, thenChrist would be the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit (all Divine). This possibility is incompatible with the revelation, sound reason, and even to the Christians’ perceptions. If the second possibility is accepted, then it would be subject to refutation since the Word itself is an attribute inseparable from its essence, and thus, it does not subsist except in what it describes. Moreover, an attribute itself is not a creating God whereas Christ is perceived to be the creating
God.
Hello Abdullah, thanks for your questions.
“But how can an element of God be fully God (i.e. God Himself)?”
It entirely depends on what you mean by ‘fully God’. If you mean ‘numerically identical to God’, the answer is that it can’t. But the Word can be ‘fully God’ in the sense of being fully divine, and/or being fully included within God’s being.
“Also, do christians approve that God should be understood as parts united together?”
Well, those who subscribe to divine simplicity don’t. But I don’t see any good reason to believe divine simplicity, and plenty of reasons to reject it. I think it’s largely a relic of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism.
“Morover, can we say the same thing said about the Word for the other attributes such the Wisdom, Knowledge, and Hearing of God”
Well, Wisdom is usually just identified with the Word. But as for the others, there is no need to accept that *all* of God’s attributes are personal.
” In fact, can we think about Jesus’ attributes on a constituent ontology?”
Attributes can themselves have attributes, just as constituents can themselves have constituents.
Any chance you could give me a resource on Ibn Tamiyya’s objection? I’d need to think about it more carefully.
“an attribute itself is not a creating God whereas Christ is perceived to be the creating”
Paul, John and Hebrews all say that God creates *through* the Word/Jesus. This fits well with the notion of the Word as an attribute, since God must use at least some of his attributes to create.
Hello Chris de Ray,
//But the Word can be ‘fully God’ in the sense of being fully divine, and/or being fully included within God’s being.//
But how cannot that lead to the numerical conclusion?! Don’t you think this is a just a philosophical wordplay?
//But as for the others, there is no need to accept that *all* of God’s attributes are personal.//
I see! But what prevents you to accept that all of God’s attributes are personal while you accept at least one as personal already?
Can we accept the word of Jesus (i.e. the word of the word) to be personal?
Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned that in his book ( Al-Jawāb al-Ṣaḥīḥ li-man baddala dīn al-Masīh).
//Paul, John and Hebrews all say that God creates *through* the Word/Jesus. This fits well with the notion of the Word as an attribute//
Yes, but Ibn Tymmyiah was refuting christians who describe Jesus as (The Creator) while in the fact Jesus was not. God is the One who creates. John’s gospel has Jesus say very clearly “I can do nothing on my own”.
@ Abdullah
We have so much knowledge now we don’t even really need Ibn Taymiyya’s(rh) arguments regarding the “logos”. This whole concept is simply “philosophy” that the Jews adopted from Hellenism (aka Greek paganism).
Remember God says in the Qur’an:
“…the Christians have said: “The Messiah is the son of God!” These are the words that have come from their own mouths, PLAGIARIZING and ADAPTING what disbelievers before them have said…” (9:30)
John’s (the only one who has this concept) sources are generally (but there is some debate) considered to be the following:
1. “Signs Gospel” (which splits into 2 other sources. PQ (his crucifixion source) and SQ (his miracles source))
2. A Gnostic Revelatory Discourse Source which “John” (really a school in Syria) then edited for refutation (hence it’s quasi Gnostic tendencies)
And finally Midrash and Theological Essays influenced by secular Hellenistic Philosophy (this is also influenced Gnosticism) that was inserted later. This is why Jesus(as) is “long-winded” in John and talks like a Greek.
“John” is so influenced by Hellenism they don’t even know if this Hellenistic Jew named Philo (20CE-75CE) influenced John or if they share a common source for their beliefs. (The Gospel of John: A Commentary by Craig Keener) Compare for yourself:
Here’s John’s famous intro (parenthesis are mine):
“In the beginning, was the Word (Logos), and the Word (Logos) was with God, and the Word (Logos) was (or “a”) God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made. (John 1:3)
Here’s Philo’s view about God from Wikipedia tell me if this sounds familiar:
Philo used the term Logos to mean an intermediary divine being, or demiurge.[13] Philo followed the Platonic distinction between imperfect matter and perfect Form, and therefore intermediary beings were necessary to bridge the enormous gap between God and the material world.[14] The Logos was the highest of these intermediary beings, and was called by Philo “the first-born of God.”[14]
Philo also wrote that “the Logos of the living God is the bond of everything, holding all things together and binding all the parts, and prevents them from being dissolved and separated.”[15]
Philo considers these divine powers in their totality also, treating them as a single independent being, which he designates “Logos”. This name, which he borrowed from Greek philosophy, was first used by Heraclitus and then adopted by the Stoics. Philo’s conception of the Logos is influenced by both of these schools. From Heraclitus he borrowed the conception of the “dividing Logos” (λόγος τομεύς), which calls the various objects into existence by the combination of contrasts (“Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit,” § 43 [i. 503]), and from Stoicism, the characterization of the Logos as the active and vivifying power. But Philo borrowed also Platonic elements in designating the Logos as the “idea of ideas” and the “archetypal idea”.[16]… He calls the Logos “second god [deuteros theos]” (Questions and Answers on Genesis 2:62), the “archangel of many names,” “taxiarch” (corps-commander), the “name of God,” also the “heavenly Adam”,[18] the “man, the word of the eternal God.”
The Logos is also designated as “high priest”, in reference to the exalted position which the high priest occupied after the Exile as the real center of the Jewish state. The Logos, like the high priest, is the expiator of sins, and the mediator and advocate for men: ἱκέτης,[19] and παράκλητος.[20]
From Alexandrian theology Philo borrowed the idea of wisdom as the mediator; he thereby somewhat confused his doctrine of the Logos, regarding wisdom as the higher principle from which the Logos proceeds, and again coordinating it with the latter… Philo’s conception of the Logos is directly related to the Middle Platonic view of God as unmoved and utterly transcendent. As such, the Logos becomes the aspect of the divine that operates in the world—through whom the world is created and sustained.[21] Philo, in connecting his doctrine of the Logos with Scripture, first of all bases on Gen. i. 27 the relation of the Logos to God. He translates this passage as follows: “He made man after the image of God,” concluding therefrom that an image of God existed.[22] This image of God is the type for all other things (the “Archetypal Idea” of Plato), a seal impressed upon things. The Logos is a kind of shadow cast by God, having the outlines but not the blinding light of the Divine Being.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philo%27s_view_of_God
All of this is pure nonsense attributed to the Prophet Jesus(as). For example, look at the problems that stemmed from philosophy influencing the Mutazilah. This is why Imam Malik HATED it. Even in my classes and I’m paraphrasing slightly he called philosophy “the study of retards” and I’m forced to agree.
“John’s (the only one who has this concept)”
This is incorrect. Paul has it too, as does the author of Hebrews. They don’t use the term ‘Logos’, but the concept is clearly the same:
“yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist.” 1 Cor 8:6
” For by[f] him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things were created through him and for him.” Col 1:16
“but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world. 3 He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature, and he upholds the universe by the word of his power.” Heb. 1:2
The notion of God’s ‘Word’/’Wisdom’ is much older than Philo (Psalm 33:6, Prov. 8, Wisdom 7)
The Gospel of John is profoundly anti-Hellenic and anti-gnostic in many ways. The idea that the divine Logos would ‘become flesh’, suffer and die would have been absolutely anathema to Greek philosophers (especially Neoplatonists and Stoics) who regarded matter as evil and inferior. That’s why the gnostics argued that Jesus wasn’t *really* in the flesh. In contrast, John the evangelists on the physicality of the incarnation and resurrection.
“Even in my classes and I’m paraphrasing slightly he called philosophy “the study of retards” and I’m forced to agree.”
So Ibn Sina, Al Kindi and Ibn Rushd were retards?
//We have so much knowledge now we don’t even really need Ibn Taymiyya’s(rh) arguments regarding the “logos”. This whole concept is simply “philosophy” that the Jews adopted from Hellenism (aka Greek paganism).//
I see that, but his brilliant argument still stands. Not to mention that the Greek background was mentioned in his writings as well. Regardless, Chris said “the article is philosophical in scope rather than historical”. The discussion here is about the idea itself regardless the historical background of it.
SAVED LIKE THE PARALYTIC?-BY STEVE FINNELL
The proponents of “FAITH ONLY” salvation like to present the paralytic as an example of one who had his sins forgiven without being baptized in water. Their position is, since Jesus forgave the paralytic without being immersed in water; so then, baptism is not essential, for those living today, in order to have sins forgiven.
PARALYTIC SALVATION: Luke 5:18-20 And some men were carrying on a bed a man who was paralyzed; and they were trying to bring him in and set him him down in front of Him. 19 But not finding any way to bring him in because of the crowd, they went up on the roof and let him down through the tiles with his stretcher, into the middle of the crowd, in front of Jesus . 20 Seeing their faith , He said , “Friend, your sins are forgiven.”
PARALYTIC SALVATION: Jesus forgave his sin because of the faith of friends.
Can men today be saved like the paralytic? No, they cannot!
The paralytic was saved without FAITH.
The paralytic was saved without REPENTANCE.
The paralytic was saved without CONFESSING Jesus as the Son of God.
The paralytic was saved without being BAPTIZED.
The paralytic was saved without BELIEVING that God raised Jesus from the dead.
The paralytic was saved without CONFESSING Jesus as Lord and Christ.
THE PARALYTIC PLAN OF SALVATION WAS- THE FAITH OF FRIENDS.
The paralytic was saved before the New Covenant was in force. Jesus had to die before the New Covenant was available.
Men today have to meet the terms of the New Agreement, that is the New Covenant.
NEW COVENANT: Hebrews 9:15-17 For this reason He is the mediator of a new covenant, so that, since a death has taken place for the redemption of the transgressions that were committed under the first covenant, those who have been called may receive the promise of eternal inheritance. 16 For were a covenant is, there must of necessity be the death of the one made it. 17 For a covenant is valid only when men are dead, for it is never in force while the one who lives made it.
The apostle Peter told all men how to be saved under the New Covenant. (Acts 2:22-41) A.D. 33 The Day of Pentecost.
New Covenant terms of pardon.
FAITH: John 3:16
REPENTANCE: Acts 2:38, Acts 3:19, Luke 24:47
CONFESSION: Romans 10:9-10, Acts 8:37
BAPTISM: Acts 2:38, Mark 16:16, 1 Peter 3:21, Acts 22:16, Colossians 2:12-13, Titus 3:5, John 3:5, Galatians 3:27, Romans 6:3-7
Was the paralytic saved? Yes, so was the thief on the cross, Enoch, Abraham, and many others before the New Covenant was in force, however, it was the blood of Jesus that washed away the sins of those who died under the Old Covenant.
IF MEN TODAY CAN HAVE THEIR SIN FORGIVEN LIKE THE PARALYTIC—–THEN THEY CAN BE SAVED WITHOUT FAITH IN JESUS CHRIST. THE PARALYTIC WAS SAVED BECAUSE OF THE FAITH OF FRIENDS!
#READ MORE at. steve-finnell.blogspot.com#READ MORE AT. megaonewayjesuslove.tumblr.com
@ Chris de Ray
To begin my apologies I should have been clearer what I meant by “the only one who has this concept”. I meant in regards to the four gospels Christians use nowadays not the entirety of the NT.
Regarding John and Gnosticism notice what I said:
“Gnostic Revelatory Discourse Source which “John” (really a school in Syria) then edited for refutation”
Obviously, the writers were “anti-gnostic” hence the beating home of “in the flesh”. What I mean is they took something that was originally gnostic then modified so you can see the gnostic undertones. The fact that early Gnostics used John(especially the prologue) is telling in and of itself. Irenaeus quotes heavily from one of their commentaries on John’s prologue which you can read here:
Against Heresies, 1.8.5
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103108.htm
According to Irenaeus, the Gnostics believed the opening verses explicitly mentioned the names of these primeval entities called “Aeons” which came one after the other from the Father. These “Aeons” names in Greek are Monogenes (aka Arche), Aletheia, Logos, Zoe, Anthropos and Charis.
In John 1:1–18 all of these Aeons are revealed by name in Greek:
1. In the “Beginning” (Arche), in which was
2. the “Word” (Logos), in which was
3. Life (Zoe), which was the “light” of
4. Man (Anthropon), which included
5. Grace (Charis), and
6. Truth (Aletheia)
Arche was also known as the Only-begotten Son (Monogenes), being the first and only-begotten Son of
8. the unknown Father (John 1:18, 17:25).
John’s theology is anything but “orthodox”; the unorthodox themes in John indicate that, his source in its original form may have been the earliest of the Gnostic gospels. One can actually argue that John has a dual theology. There is one part of John that echoes the Jewish tradition, and then there is another part that really resembles some form of Gnosticism.I personally believe if John had never been “canonical” and we found it in a cave 1959, everyone would think it was gnostic. And if anyone accepts John they should have no problem accepting Thomas then as any argument brought against it applies to John. So as the Quran says Christians only adapted and plagiarized disbelievers.
As for your last question, none of these men are Sahaba, tabieen, or taba tabieen so they hold no religious significance to me. Quite frankly, Imam Malik is of a much higher caliber in regards to scholarship then all of them put together. IF (I say “if” as I haven’t read they’re works so I would need proof) they believed in Hellenistic pagan philosophy and tried to mix it with Islam, like the people who did with Jesus’s(as) followers I have no problem placing them under the umbrella term of “retard”. Much like I did yesterday with Imam Zamakhshari (debatably one of the greatest Arabic linguist of the Middle Ages) when he tried to use philosophy to distort the clear meaning of a Quranic verse.
Why, because philosophy is retarded (the only exception I’ve personally seen so far are the rules of logic in a discussion). For the most part, there is no proof for anything stated and it’s really just glorified “this is how I feel” and arguing over semantics (especially in regards to God and metaphysics).
@ Abdullah
It’s not brilliant because it’s not real. God is not like this so its based on nothing but whims from people’s minds passed off as being “deep”. You cannot claim things about God He Himself never revealed. This would be like me saying:
“Shiva and Vishnu don’t destroy creation because of their long history together in the Godhead… And so that’s why they get along.”
Shiva and Vishnu are not God so it’s a bunch of nonsense that doesn’t need to be explored anymore. The same thing applies with Jesus(as) and the pagan god idol “Logos”. Jesus was one of God’s Messengers, Logos is from the minds of people who then inspired others to turn Jesus(as) into the idol Logos. We clearly see this is what happened so there is no need to refute the argument.
@ Abdullah
Sorry lack of reading comprehension on my part you were saying Ibn Taymiyya’s argument was brilliant lol my bad.
P.s. philosophy is still retarded. “Am I here? Are we really real? What is real?” Soooo….deep.
Stew:
“What I mean is they took something that was originally gnostic then modified so you can see the gnostic undertones”
Well, I’ve no doubt that the Gnostics have used GJohn for their purposes. But quite frankly, the differences between the theology of GJohn and gnosticism are so radical (re. incarnation, resurrection etc) that to call it a gnostic Gospel is to misunderstand it entirely, in my view.
“And if anyone accepts John they should have no problem accepting Thomas then as any argument brought against it applies to John.”
Huh? John and Thomas are completely different. Thomas has no narrative whatsoever, and presents Jesus as some kind of Hellenistic sage. No trace of incarnation, crucifixion or resurrection. Exactly what gnostics like, and totally antithetical to John.
“Why, because philosophy is retarded (the only exception I’ve personally seen so far are the rules of logic in a discussion). For the most part, there is no proof for anything stated and it’s really just glorified “this is how I feel” and arguing over semantics (especially in regards to God and metaphysics).”
Mate, you clearly haven’t studied it. I recommend reading through the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and see for yourself if it’s just glorified ‘this is how i feel’. You could start with this entry: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/
Abdullah:
“But how cannot that lead to the numerical conclusion?! Don’t you think this is a just a philosophical wordplay?”
No, a part/constituent is not numerically identical to the whole to which it belongs. To say that Logos is fully divine is to say that it is totally part of God, not that it is numerically identical to God.
“I see! But what prevents you to accept that all of God’s attributes are personal while you accept at least one as personal already?”
Just because one is personal, doesn’t mean they all are. What prevents me to accept them all as personal is that I have no reason to do so.
ON THAT NOTE GENTLEMEN…I’m going to leave things here, as I don’t have the time for five conversations at once. But I enjoyed our discussions. See you folks.
Mental Gymnastics quite alien to the real life historical HUMAN person Jesus of Nazareth.
“Mental Gymnastics quite alien to the real life historical HUMAN person Jesus of Nazareth.”
I agree and I would add “Mental Gymnastics quite alien to the text of John chapter 1”
An attribute is just a passive effect in the mind of some thing or other, nothing more.
This is totally at odds with the text of John 1.